

THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF POLITICAL/PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION IN THE CONDITIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL AND OTHER OPTIONS OF NON-PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES IN THE WORLD

The article considers and systematizes the meaning, functionality, optionality and consequences of political, as well as parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidential and other options of non-parliamentary democracies in the world. It is stated that the opposition in the case of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies should be considered more broadly, but also in a slightly different sense than within parliamentary democracies. In particular, due to the fact that it is not an alternative to the executive, but is a manifestation or a mechanism of checks and balances in the conditions of a “rigid” separation of powers. In addition, it is found that the political opposition in presidentialism is determined by various institutional and political factors that can act as veto players, in particular by federal system, bicameral parliament, type of party system, qualities of the head of state, etc. This “broadens” the spectrum of political opposition in the case of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies, but does not strengthen parliamentary opposition in such political systems. Thus, it is proven that parliamentary opposition in non-parliamentary democracies is significantly more limited than in the case of parliamentary democracies, but in general political opposition here is much more “broader”.

Keywords: political opposition, parliamentary opposition, presidential democracy, parliamentary democracy, presidentialism, the head of state, government, administration.

ZNACZENIE I CEL OPOZYCJI POLITYCZNEJ/PARLAMENTARNEJ W WARUNKACH DEMOKRACJI PREZYDENCCKIEJ I INNYCH OPCJI DEMOKRACJI POZAPARLAMENTARNYCH NA ŚWIECIE

W artykule rozważa się i systematyzuje znaczenie, funkcjonalność, opcjonalność i konsekwencje opozycji politycznej, a także parlamentarnej w warunkach demokracji prezydenckich i innych opcji demokracji pozaparlamentarnych na świecie. Stwierdza się, że opozycja, w przypadku demokracji prezydenckich lub pozaparlamentarnych, powinna być rozpatrywana szerzej, ale też w nieco innym znaczeniu niż w ramach demokracji parlamentarnych. W szczególności ze względu na fakt, że nie stanowi ona alternatywy dla władzy wykonawczej, ale jest przejawem lub mechanizmem kontroli i równowagi w warunkach „sztywnego” podziału władz. Ponadto stwierdza się, że opozycja polityczna w prezydencjalizmie jest zdeterminowana różnymi czynnikami instytucjonalnymi i politycznymi, które mogą pełnić rolę veta, w szczególności

ze względu na system federalny, dwuizbowy parlament, typ systemu partyjnego, cechy głowy państwa itp. „Poszerza” to spektrum opozycji politycznej w przypadku demokracji prezydenckich lub pozaparlamentarnych, ale nie wzmacnia opozycji parlamentarnej w takich systemach politycznych. Udowodniono, że opozycja parlamentarna w demokracjach pozaparlamentarnych jest znacznie bardziej ograniczona niż w przypadku demokracji parlamentarnych, ale generalnie opozycja polityczna jest tu znacznie „szersza”.

Słowa kluczowe: opozycja polityczna, opozycja parlamentarna, demokracja prezydencka, demokracja parlamentarna, prezydencjalizm, głowa państwa, rząd, administracja

ЗНАЧЕННЯ ТА ПРИЗНАЧЕННЯ ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ/ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКОЇ ОПОЗИЦІЇ В УМОВАХ ПРЕЗИДЕНТСЬКИХ ТА ІНШИХ ОПЦІЙ НЕПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЙ У СВІТІ

У статті розглянуто й систематизовано значення, функціонал, опціонал і наслідки політичної та, зокрема, парламентської опозиції в умовах президентських й інших опцій непарламентських демократій у світі. Встановлено, що опозицію у випадку президентських чи непарламентських демократій треба розглядати ширше, однак й в дещо іншому значенні, аніж у парламентських демократіях. Зокрема за рахунок того, що вона не є альтернативою виконавчій владі, однак є виявом або механізмом стримувань і протидії в умовах «жорсткого» поділу влади. Додатково виявлено, що політична опозиція в президенталізмі детермінується різними інституційними і політичними чинниками, які можуть виступати в ролі вето-гравців, зокрема федеративним устроєм, двопалатністю парламенту, типом партійної системи, якостями глави держави тощо. Це «розширює» спектр політичної опозиції у випадку президентських або непарламентських демократій, але не посилює парламентської опозиції у таких політичних системах. Доведено, що парламентська опозиція у непарламентських демократіях суттєво лімітованіша, ніж у випадку парламентських демократій, а загалом політична опозиція тут значно «ширша».

Ключові слова: політична опозиція, парламентська опозиція, президентська демократія, парламентська демократія, президенталізм, глава держави, уряд, адміністрація.

A lot is known about the parliamentary opposition in modern political science and practice, and this topic is very much discussed. However, the condition of such a developed state of affairs is that the parliamentary opposition is typically thought about and classically practiced in the conditions of various forms (monarchies and republics) and systems of government (parliamentarism and typically semi-presidentialism), which are reduced to the common denominator of

the so-called parliamentary democracies. And this is not at all surprising, since parliamentary democracies are traditionally called those democratic political systems in which, regardless of the logic of inter-institutional relations, in the triangle “head of state – government – parliament” (which actually determines the form and system of government), the government cabinet (usually headed by the prime minister) if it is not formed, it can certainly be prematurely dismissed (or, in other words, is collectively responsible to) the parliament (and therefore possibly both to the parliament and to the president). Accordingly, the parliament (as such) and its party-political structuring (in particular) initially influence what the composition of the government cabinet will be, that is, which parliamentary political forces will be responsible for the government and will be associated with the government, and what will be the parliamentary political forces in terms of political forces in the parliament opposition in one or another state in one or another period of time. Taking this into account, the parliamentary opposition is determined in this case primarily by the results of the parliamentary elections and the consequences of inter-party or in general political relations between different parties and political actors in the legislature, which, on the one hand, affects the definition of the government, and also, on the other hand, delimits the parliamentary opposition from pro-government parties in the legislature. Nevertheless, parliamentary opposition takes place not only in parliamentary democracies (with parliamentary and semi-presidential systems of government), but also in other political systems in which the formation and responsibility of government cabinets are not determined by the functionality and role of popularly elected parliaments, since in the latter political parties and political actors are nevertheless structured along the lines of power/government–not power/opposition. But in such a context, much less is known about the parliamentary opposition, and therefore in our research the attention will be focused precisely on the correction of the identified deficiency in the development of political science, including through the prism of understanding the political opposition as such (and not only the parliamentary opposition as a type or form of political opposition).

We believe that political opposition in the context of non-parliamentary democracies, including in order to define the format and optionality of parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidential and other democracies, should be discussed broadly. The fact is that in such political systems the government is not formed with the submission and consent of the parliament, the structuring of which should be the basis for distinguishing government and opposition political actors (as in the case of parliamentary democracies), and taking into account who in the process of governing opposes the goals of the executive power (the head of state and/or the government formed by the head of the state), or, in other words, taking into account whose interests and resistance must be reconciled or overcome before that, how the executive power will be exercised (provided, of course, that it is permissible)¹. Such a rather broad understanding of the political opposition fits into the fundamental principles of the

¹ Schapiro L., Foreword, “*Government and Opposition*” 1966, vol 1, nr.1, s. 2.

development and functioning of democracies as such, after all the essence of the latter comes down, in particular, to the recognition of the right of political and public figures to publicly criticize and challenge the government – that is, in the case of non-parliamentary (primarily presidential) democracies, the head of state, his government/administration and the political system in general². It follows that, regardless of the institutional and procedural option, democracy as such is possible only if it allows the question of political opposition to be raised and resolved as its own “first axis” and a component that ensures political participation and political competitiveness³.

This undoubtedly proves that political opposition can be considered very differently, because it has a diverse etymological nature and a social or socio-political essence⁴. At least because in the conditions of a democracy any political position can generate political opposition, and the latter is not necessarily or not always expressed through the parliament or within the framework of the parliament, etc. (which, in contrast, is the norm primarily for parliamentary democracies).

Here, the idea is taken as a basis, according to which the political opposition in the conditions of democracy is a self-sufficient and autonomous entity, because democracy as such (including presidential or more broadly non-parliamentary) involves differentiation or mutual opposition between power and non-power or, in other words, between the representatives of the authorities (the head of the state, his administration or government, etc.) and political actors who oppose the representatives of the authorities or correct them – political opposition⁵. On the other hand, the “authenticity” and “reality” of democracy should imbue the political opposition with real and even institutional (formalized and informal) meaning, since if the political opposition does exist and is influential, then it is definitely a component of the structuring of the political system of one or another country, and quite regardless of the system of government and the option/model of democracy in it – parliamentary or presidential (though certainly in view of the institutional/constitutional factors, electoral and party system, political culture, etc⁶). In other words, in the conditions of democracy, including the presidential one (primarily within the framework of the presidential system of government), the power (the head of state and/or his administration/government) cannot very effectively dictate actions to his opponents – the political opposition – although he can influence them formally and

² Helms L., Introduction: Studying Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies: Issues and Perspectives, *“The Journal of Legislative Studies”* 2008, vol 14, nr. 1, s. 6–19.

³ Dahl R., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1971.

⁴ McLennan B., Approaches to the Concept of Political Opposition: An Historical Overview, [w:] McLennan B. (ed.), *Political Opposition and Dissent*, Wyd. Dunellen 1973, s. 1–50.; Sadoun M., Opposition et démocratie, *“Pouvoirs. Revue Française d’Etudes Constitutionnelles et Politiques”* 2004, vol 108, s. 5–21.

⁵ Ionescu G., de Madariaga I., *Die Opposition. Ihre politische Funktion in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Wyd. Beck 1971.

⁶ Blondel J., Political Opposition in the Contemporary World, *“Government and Opposition”* 1997, vol 32, nr. 4, s. 462–486.; Foltz W., Political Oppositions in Single-Party States of Tropical Africa, [w:] Dahl R. (ed.), *Regimes and Oppositions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1973, s. 143–170.; Tibi B., Politische Opposition in Westasien und in Afrika. Einige vergleichende und typisierende Betrachtungen, [w:] Euchner W. (ed.), *Politische Opposition in Deutschland und im internationalen Vergleich*, Wyd. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1993, s. 155–172.

informally and vice versa⁷, through which one of the fundamental principles of democracy itself is understood, according to which the nature of the political opposition reflects the nature of political power⁸. Therefore, if we are talking about democracy, then the political opposition within its framework – and regardless of the type/model of democracy – works (as intended) in the role of a mechanism of checks and balances of power, and through both parliamentary and non-parliamentary channels, as well as a guarantee tool political participation and political competitiveness.

It follows that the political opposition in the case of parliamentary democracies is traditionally defined and filled with content in a more structured and clear way, while in the case of presidential and other democracies it is more broad and comprehensive, and therefore rather blurred⁹. This is perhaps the most noticeable given the fact that in presidential democracies the political opposition is not necessarily a means of checks and balances of power (the head of state and/or his administration/government) or a party or political actor that has a minority within the framework of the political process, including these ones in the parliament.

Moreover, quite often the elections of the head of state and the elections of the parliament in such political systems are not synchronous at all, and therefore the party-political structure of the parliament can change within the term of office of one and the same president, which therefore may or may not even be institutionally (in the majority) in opposition to the head of state (as is quite often the case, for example, in presidential republics in the USA and a number of Latin American countries, etc.). Instead, the main factor in this sense is another factor in the systematic definition of political opposition in democracies – the relationship of being in one or another form of disagreement with another authority¹⁰, in particular, in inter-institutional disagreement between the executive and legislative branches of government from the point of view of the party-political affiliation of their representatives or the majority (in particular in the parliament) of them. Purely mechanistically, this fits into the remarks of scientists, according to which political opposition in a democracy (including a presidential one) takes place when some political actor (party, institution, etc.) “logically and morphologically” opposes the position of the government, primarily the executive one¹¹, and even in the form of a political or inter-institutional conflict. Accordingly, the “breadth” of the interpretation of the political opposition in

⁷ Lust-Okar E., The Management of Opposition: Formal Structures of Contestation and Informal Political Manipulation, [w:] Schlumberger O. (ed.), *Debating Arab Authoritarianism. Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 2007, s. 34–35.

⁸ Anderson L., Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition: Reflections on the Middle East, “*Journal of International Affairs*” 1987, vol 40, nr. 2, s. 220.

⁹ Brack N., Weinblum S., *What do we mean by “political opposition”? A theoretical perspective*, Presented at Potsdam ECPR General Conference (9–12 September 2009); Brack N., Weinblum S., “Political Opposition”: Towards a Renewed Research Agenda, “*Interdisciplinary Political Studies*” 2011, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 69–79.

¹⁰ Norton P., Making Sense of Opposition, “*The Journal of Legislative Studies*” 2008, vol 14, nr. 1, s. 236.

¹¹ Dahl R., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1966, s. 16–18.; Dahl R., Governments and Political Oppositions, [w:] Greenstein F., Polsby N. (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3: Macropolitical Theory*, Wyd. Addison Wesley 1975, s. 116–117.; Ionescu G., de Madariaga I., *Opposition: Past and Present of a Political Institution*, Wyd. The New Thinker Library 1968, s. 1, 2.

presidential democracies is determined by the understanding of the latter both institutionally and normatively, and structurally and functionally¹². In this context, it is important that the political opposition – institutionalized or non-institutionalized one – in a presidential and in general any democracy should act as an instrumental channel for ordering and preserving the integrity of the political system, since it should not only be a means and a manifestation of mutual political recognition and competition between power and non-power, but also a kind of “fuse” against sudden outbreaks of possible protests and violence, including at the expense of electoral support, promotion and protection of alternative positions¹³. Although this does not at all exclude the fact that the political opposition, especially in the case of presidentialism, cannot be anti-systemic or obstructive¹⁴, which is sometimes little or even occurs during the transition of political regimes of presidential or semi-presidential republics (and other non-parliamentary systems of government) from authoritarian to hybrid or democratic, that is, during their democratization. This was most vividly reflected at different times in a number of countries in Latin America, Africa, and even Asia¹⁵.

On this basis, it can be confidently asserted that the delineation of the political opposition in non-parliamentary democracies differs from a similar one in parliamentary democracies primarily by its “breadth” in the case of the former or, in other words, the fact that in the latter the political opposition is usually perceived more narrowly, concretized and one-dimensional, in particular mainly as the parliamentary opposition¹⁶. That is why the political opposition in the conditions of a presidential or any other non-parliamentary democracy is much less organized and focused than in the case of a parliamentary democracy, and therefore, unlike the latter, its goal is not necessarily reduced to the change of power – the government or the head of state (as in the case of parliamentary democracies)¹⁷, – because this, for example, is not the domain of influence and authority of the parliament, which may even be institutionally and politically opposed to the president and his or her government/administration. This is due to the fact that in the conditions of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies, the parliamentary opposition is not at all equal to the political opposition as a whole, but is really only its separate, and not always the most important, cluster. The reason is that political opposition in such political systems is reflected as a manifestation and result of a greater number of options of political competitiveness, although political competitiveness in itself is not a direct predictor

¹² Alibasic A., *Political Opposition in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought in The Arab World*, Kuala Lumpur 1999.

¹³ Kolinsky E., Opposition, [w:] Bogdanor V. (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science*, Wyd. Blackwell 1992, s. 397–400; Kolinsky E., *Opposition in Western Europe*, Wyd. Croom Helm 1987.

¹⁴ Wjatr J., Przeworski A., Control without Opposition, “*Government and Opposition*” 1966., vol 1, nr. 2, s. 227–239.

¹⁵ Albrecht H., *Political Opposition and Authoritarian Rule in Egypt*, Wyd. Eberhard-Karls Universität Tübingen 2008.; Albrecht H., How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt, “*Democratization*” 2005, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 378–397.; Rodan G., *Theorising Political Opposition in East and Southeast Asia*, [w:] Rodan G. (ed.), *Political Opposition in Industrializing Asia*, Wyd. Routledge 1996, s. 1–39.

¹⁶ Ionescu G., de Madariaga I., *Opposition: Past and Present of a Political Institution*, Wyd. The New Thinker Library 1968, s. 9.

¹⁷ Brack N., Weinblum S., *What do we mean by “political opposition”: A theoretical perspective*, Presented at Potsdam ECPR General Conference (9–12 September 2009).

of the formation of political opposition. In addition, competitiveness in presidential or non-parliamentary democracies is not only the opposition of the government/executive power and pro-government parties in the parliament against the parties of the non-governmental group in the legislature, but also the opposition of the person of the head of state and the political forces opposing the latter, and as in the parliament, as well as outside the parliament, but not always about gaining power as an alternative in the future. In the case of presidential systems, it is rather about empowering the political opposition with the main function of “checking” or “controlling” the executive power on the part of other institutions, primarily the parliament, or political actors who are political opponents of the executive power (that is, both the president and his or her administration or the government)¹⁸, thanks to which freedom, competitiveness and, in general, procedural democracy as such is ensured, at least in theory¹⁹.

It is noted that the parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidentialism is not equivalent to the political opposition as a whole, and that the parliamentary opposition in such a political system has much more functionality and roles, primarily of a deterrent and preventive nature, since it is presidentialism that is characterized by a “hard” and true separation of powers.

In addition, the parliamentary opposition (after all, unlike in parliamentary democracies) mostly occasionally in the conditions of presidentialism serves as an expression of an alternative political course and the course of activity of the executive power (mainly the head of state), and instead is a channel for the articulation of various political interests and social requests, especially in multi-component societies and federal states. And this is even on the condition that different articulations and interests cannot be taken into account or taken into consideration completely²⁰, after all this may contradict the political course, which is regulated and determined by the president/executive power in the conditions of non-parliamentary democracies, which a priori are not opposition. In this case, even a situation where the parliamentary opposition will form the majority in the legislature of a presidential democracy will not help, since the executive power in such a political system is not the domain of the parliament – neither in terms of formation, nor even more so in terms of collective responsibility or the possibility of early resignation of the executive power. Instead, no one disputes the importance of the political, including the parliamentary, opposition within the framework of presidential democracy in the format of serving as a channel of communication between the public and the political/executive power regarding specific political issues or in the role of a kind of “safety valve”²¹. Accordingly, regardless of the status of the political opposition in the conditions of presidential democracies, formalized or informal, it can still act as a factor that politicizes the political and

¹⁸ Sartori G., Opposition and Control: Problems and Prospects, *“Government and Opposition”* 1966, vol 1, nr.1, s. 149–154.

¹⁹ De Jouvenel B., The Means of Contestation, *“Government and Opposition”* 1965–1966, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 155–174.

²⁰ Parry G., Opposition Questions, *“Government and Opposition”* 1997, vol 32, nr. 4, s. 457–461.

²¹ Sartori G., Opposition and Control: Problems and Prospects, *“Government and Opposition”* 1966, vol 1, nr.1, s. 150.

even apolitical process, in particular at the expense of public discussion and the transformation of certain social issues into political channel.

This, in turn, once again adds systematicity to the democratic political regime under presidentialism, including due to its additional legitimization and response to the requests of the electorate, even if they are not a direct alternative for the head of state and the executive power and do not generate a direct influence on legislative process and governance. On the other hand, it is in the conditions of presidentialism (even within the framework of a democratic regime) that the president and his government/administration have a great “temptation” to ignore the requests and positions of the political opposition, due to which the latter, unlike parliamentary democracies²², is a priori oriented not so much towards the government and its conquest, how much for adaptation to power. The situation is even more complicated and worse in the case of a non-democratic (and to a lesser extent – a hybrid) political regime (especially under a presidential or semi-presidential system of government), when various political and even institutional structures and factors significantly prevent the political, including the parliamentary, opposition from achieving its primary and theoretically unconditional goals and guidelines, in particular from the sphere of checks and balances of the head of state and his or her government/administration.

This is not helped by the fact that the political opposition can be institutionalized and formalized, which, by the way, happens more often precisely in the case of non-democratic political regimes, since in democracies (parliamentary and non-parliamentary) the status and role of the political opposition are rather determined conventionally and on the basis of political traditions or, additionally, due to normative regulations. At the same time, in the conditions of presidentialism and sometimes semi-presidentialism, even if they are democracies, it sometimes happens that parliaments are poorly structured, and therefore it is difficult to separate the minority (which is typically oppositional) from the majority. Instead, strangely enough, situations where the majority of the parliament appears in opposition (institutionally) to the head of state and his government cabinet/administration are a clear exception, as this is possible precisely in the case of presidentialism and sometimes semi-presidentialism. However, even this does not interfere with the unity and structuring of the political system, since in such cases and political systems the heads of state/government are responsible for the executive power (as one vertical), and the parliaments are responsible for the legislative power (as another vertical), and nominally without even crossing each other. In view of this, in presidential or non-parliamentary democracies after all it is not capable of grasping it, but on operational tasks and issues of choosing additional (rather than alternative) development paths, etc²³. Accordingly, the role of the political opposition in the conditions of presidential and non-parliamentary democracies

²² Norton P., Making Sense of Opposition. *“The Journal of Legislative Studies”* 2008, vol 14, nr. 1, s. 238.

²³ Brack N., Weinblum S., *What do we mean by “political opposition”: A theoretical perspective*, Presented at Potsdam ECPR General Conference (9–12 September 2009).; Brack N., Weinblum S., “Political Opposition”: Towards a Renewed Research Agenda, *“Interdisciplinary Political Studies”* 2011, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 69–79.

can be played both by parties that have a minority in the legislatures (as in the case of parliamentary democracies), and by parties or political actors that have a majority in the parliaments, as a result of which the political opposition in such a case is inter-institutional. After all, it is possible that the role of the political opposition in the conditions of presidentialism will not be concentrated in the parliament, but outside the framework of any political institutions. Because of this, presidentialism has a greater potential to be a political opposition precisely not from the “chairs” of the parliamentary minority, but simply by politicizing certain issues and broadcasting them to the public and the executive power – the head of state and his or her government/administration.

At the same time, the role and functionality of the actual parliamentary opposition is very specific in the case of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies in general, since this also takes place. Here, first of all, it is necessary to note the idea discussed above, according to which parliamentary opposition in non-parliamentary democracies can be expressed both in a parliamentary minority (like parliamentary democracies) and in a parliamentary majority (when the parliamentary opposition acquires the status of inter-institutional opposition to the head of state and its government/administration²⁴).

The interpretation of the parliamentary opposition in parliamentary and non-parliamentary democracies is mainly related to the fact that it covers primarily those representatives/parties of the parliament that do not have the status and significance of the government, that is, that are not associated with the head of state and his administration. Instead, the main difference in the determination of the parliamentary opposition is that, within the framework of parliamentary democracies, the parliamentary opposition is determined by the framework of the legislature as the basis of the “merged” (rather than separate) structuring of the legislative and executive sphere of the political process, and in presidential democracies, parliaments have almost nothing to do with this, because they are “involved” only in law-making, and not in the executive vertical, the formation and responsibility of governments, which, in contrast, is the domain of heads of state²⁵. Therefore, for parliamentary democracies, the parliamentary format of the political opposition is quite basic, and instead, its extra-parliamentary design appears as a manifestation of the opposition’s dysfunction²⁶, but this is not typical for presidential democracies, in which the extra-parliamentary opposition can be much stronger than the parliamentary opposition, and it may not even pose any threat to the political system. In general, this clearly proves that in the case of presidentialism, it is not enough, and often inappropriate, to consider the political opposition as a ratio along the “minority-majority” line in the parliament, because opposition takes place

²⁴ Blondel J., Political Opposition in the Contemporary World, “*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr. 4, s. 462–486.

²⁵ Dubrow J., Tomescu I., *Political Opposition to the USA Patriot Act of 2001*, Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (14 August 2004).; Kramm L., Grundzüge einer Theorie der politische opposition, “*Zeitschrift für Politik*” 1986, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 33–43.

²⁶ Giulj S., Confrontation or Conciliation: The Status of the Opposition in Europe, “*Government and Opposition*” 1981, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 476–494.; Giulj S., *Le statut de l’opposition en Europe*, Wyd. Documentation Française 1980.

not only or not so much between parts of the parliament (as is the basis in parliamentary democracies), and even between the parliament (the party-political majority in it) and the executive branch of government (the head of state and his or her government/administration).

This is supplemented by the fact that parliaments, including in presidential democracies, are not monolithic institutions at all, and therefore their structuring is diverse and variable. That is why the format of the parliamentary opposition is determined by various sets of relations between parties, deputies and generally political actors in legislatures, in particular inter-party ones (including along the “majority-minority” line or even within the pro-government majority or minority), intra-party (even within the party that is associated with the head of state and in general with the executive power), intra-coalition (at the level of legislative coalitions in the parliament), intra-coalition (at the level of legislative coalitions in the parliament), non-party (when the political positions of some actors do not depend on the affiliation of these actors to certain parliamentary parties), etc.²⁷, which determine what is and what is not parliamentary opposition in each specific case of presidential democracy.

Such a diversity of manifestations and factors that influence the parliamentary opposition in presidential democracies is due to the fact that in such political systems it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the “majority” and “minority” in the legislature, especially given the fact that nominally it may not affect the executive vertical and the head of state, about which, in principle, the opposition as such should be formed.

In addition, such a variety of interpretations of even the parliamentary opposition in presidentialism proves that it is weakly institutionalized (weaker than in parliamentary democracy), because its format is very fluid and determined by a fairly wide range of loci and types of relations, including inter-party, intra-party, non-party, inter-institutional, etc. In this case, the main thing is that such a parliamentary opposition (if it exists) articulates (including in political discourse and through political behavior) one or another form of disagreement with the executive power²⁸ (often it is even said that with a political regime or a regime of one or another head of state), which, in turn, is not derived from the institution of the parliament. And this, as the practice of presidentialism attests, is difficult, especially in the conditions of non-democratic political regimes, because it happens that even a nominally regulated political opposition is actually organized in such a way that it does not have the opportunity to act in the parliamentary arena or is presented in the parliamentary arena in an exclusively “facade” way²⁹. This is supplemented by the fact that if we are talking about a democratic presidential

²⁷ Norton P., Making Sense of Opposition, “*The Journal of Legislative Studies*” 2008, vol 14, nr. 1, s.244–246; Boucek F., Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism, “*Party Politics*” 2009, vol 15, nr. 4, s. 455–485; King A., Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany, “*Legislative Studies Quarterly*” 1976, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 11–34.

²⁸ Dahl R., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1966, s. 17.; Barker R., *Studies in Opposition*, Wyd. Macmillan 1971, s. 4–5.

²⁹ Rodan G., Theorising Political Opposition in East and Southeast Asia, [w:] Rodan G. (ed.), *Political Opposition in Industrializing Asia*, Wyd. Routledge 1996, s.17–20.

system in which the parliamentary opposition is quite weak, then in this case the role and functionality of the extra-parliamentary political opposition (it may or may not be associated with the parliamentary opposition) almost automatically grows, in particular through various social groups incorporated into non-parliamentary parties, mass media, interest groups, pressure and lobbies, socio-political movements, social and cultural organizations, corporations, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, etc. However, in this case, everything depends mainly on whether the political (parliamentary and/or extra-parliamentary) opposition is entrenched, stereotyped or institutionalized³⁰, and, in the case of presidential democracies, not always in the sense of modifying and adopting decisions of the executive power, but at least of legislative decisions, which go against the decisions of the executive power. And for this, it is important that presidentialism is a case of a democratic political regime and is perceived by political actors as an inter-institutional consensus, which should additionally contribute to reality and functionality (including regarding the role as a “safeguard” and a mechanism of checks and balances), rather than the “facades” of political opposition, as is often or mostly the case in autocratic and hybrid political regimes.

From this we can draw an unequivocal conclusion that the structuring of the parliamentary opposition is influenced by many factors, but the most important and systemic among them is the institutional design, in particular the executive-legislative relations, and therefore the executive-legislative attributes and factors of the structuring of the parliamentary opposition. They primarily appear against the background of the differences between, on the one hand, parliamentary and presidential democracies, as well as, on the other hand, parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential systems of government, with the well-known condition that the latter should be divided into presidential-parliamentary (as in logic and practice typically more presidential) and parliamentary-presidential or prime-presidential (as in logic and practice typically more parliamentary). The reason and explanation is that the type of democracy and the system of government determine very different conditions for the development of opposition activities and the status of the parliamentary opposition in particular and the political opposition in general. In this context, it should be noted that presidential and very often presidential-parliamentary systems of government (especially if the latter is not a case of parliamentary democracy, and the presidential system is not such a case a priori) are often related in this regard, after all these designs of inter-institutional relations not only exclude, but also provoke the opposition of the parliamentary opposition to the course of the head of state and often his or her government, in particular in the case (when it comes to the presidential-parliamentary system) if the latter reflects the political positions of the head of state.

In addition, it should be noted that for presidential and less often presidential-parliamentary systems of government, a clear distinction between the status of the executive power and the political opposition is typical. After all, the consolidating factor for the functioning of the

³⁰ Wjart J., Przeworski A., Control without Opposition, *“Government and Opposition”* 1966., vol 1, nr. 2, s. 227–239.

parliamentary and even the political opposition in general, which does not directly affect the formation and activity of the executive power, is of course the first presidential (and then the parliamentary) elections, which can only bring the former opposition to the executive power. It follows that the parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies does not have sufficiently comfortable conditions for its existence, although it can even act as a majority in the parliament, which is in opposition to the head of state and his or her government/administration in the case of the so-called “divided government” (which quite often happens in the USA and other presidential democracies, which are characterized primarily by separate and asynchronous elections of the president and parliament). After all, although such a situation forces the head of state to seek support from the parliamentary majority, which in this case is oppositional, but in no way nominally limits the executive power of the head of state, who monistically (without the approval of the parliament – as it is in parliamentary democracies) manages it. The situation is complicated by the fact that presidentialism is characterized by a rigid separation of powers (primarily executive – the president and legislative – the parliament) with specific mechanisms of checks and balances, as a result of which there is no need for such an option of inter-institutional relations to be rigidly divided into a parliamentary majority and a parliamentary minority, and therefore the parliamentary opposition can be both a majority and a minority in the legislature. In general, this means that the choice of the system of government and the type of democracy not only reveals the line of activity of the parliamentary and political opposition in general, but also serves as the basis for its definition and essential content, on the basis of which the opposition can be structured primarily in view of its attitude towards the head of state, and to the government, and in general to the executive power, and also in view of the special arrangement of priorities, powers and relations by various institutions. In addition, it affects how the parliamentary and generally political opposition is able to change its emphasis and influence on the head of state and the government, since on the basis of taking into account executive-legislative relations, it is possible to structure their models, in which the distinction between the status of the executive power and the political opposition is inherent or absent.

It is also interesting and obvious that the parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidentialism controls not so much the functioning and alternatives of the executive power (the president and the government or the administration), since it is nominally unable to influence this, but rather the prevention of usurpation of power in the political system by its executive “core.” And such a usurpation of power is quite likely, for which the presidential and some presidential-parliamentary systems are criticized, the structure of which is implemented according to the principle of “the winner gets everything.” All these things determine the specific development of the so-called “principled” political opposition³¹, which very rarely gravitates to

³¹ Linz, J., *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference*, [w:] Linz, J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3–87.

“bargaining” on the basis of coalition and corporatist strategies, but in the conditions of democracy should act as a constructive phenomenon, in which the interests of various veto players are taken into account³². In this context, it is theoretically and methodologically important that in countries with a presidential or, more rarely, a presidential-parliamentary system of government (especially if they are democratic), the parliamentary opposition traditionally and on average makes sense only in the struggle for the position of the country’s president, after all it is he who determines the activities of the executive branch of government. This is what makes the parliamentary opposition in non-parliamentary democracies a separate analytical cluster, which differs significantly from the parliamentary opposition in parliamentary democracies³³.

On the other hand, researchers quite often state that this creates conditions according to which the parliamentary opposition within the framework or conditions of presidentialism, in particular due to the relatively low party discipline in voting and due to the impossibility of being an “alternative” to the executive power, in reality is not “real” the parliamentary opposition at all³⁴. And this is despite the fact that the nature of politics in legislative assemblies in presidential or non-parliamentary democracies (for example, in the USA or Switzerland, etc.) is very similar to the situation in parliamentary democracies³⁵. Instead, the weakness of the parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidentialism is evidenced by the fact that in such political systems there is an actual transfer of “oppositional functions” from the parliamentary opposition to other participants in the political process, in particular, such as interest groups or mass media, due to which parliamentary opposition is replaced by extra-parliamentary opposition³⁶.

After all, presidential or non-parliamentary democracy is specific in that it can be characterized by intra-governmental opposition or opposition in the internal structure of the executive power. This is due to the fact that, as the researchers note, the bureaucracy under presidentialism can be a force in “its own right”, and not from the point of view of inter-party relations and party-political structuring of the parliament. In addition, this is due to the already mentioned “rigid” and special division of power between the executive and legislative branches (which do not “merge” as in parliamentary democracies) precisely in the conditions of presidentialism. The situation is complemented by other institutional and political factors that can act as veto players in the case of presidentialism, in particular, the federal state system, the bicameral parliament,

³² Tsebelis G., *Veto players: How political institutions work*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2002.

³³ Stepan A., Skach C., Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism, “*World Politics*” 1993, vol 46, nr 1, s. 1–22.; Linz J., Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference, [w:] Linz J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3–87.

³⁴ Dahl R., Thinking About Democratic Constitutions: Conclusions From Democratic Experience, [w:] Dahl R. (eds.), *Toward Democracy: A Journey. Reflections, 1940–1997*, Wyd. University of California 1997, s. 496–499.

³⁵ Mayhew D., *America’s Congress. Actions in the Public Sphere, James Madison Through Newt Gingrich*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000, s. 106–122.; Sciarini P., The Decision-Making Process, [w:] Klothe U. (ed.), *Handbook of Swiss Politics*, Wyd. Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2007, s. 465–499.; Kerr H., The Structure of the Opposition in the Swiss Parliament, “*Legislative Studies Quarterly*” 1978, vol 3, s. 51–62.

³⁶ Krauss E., The Mass Media and Japanese Politics: Effects and Consequences, [w:] Pharr S., Krauss E. (eds.), *Media and Politics in Japan*, Wyd. University of Hawaii Press 1996, s. 360.; Hallin D., Mancini P., *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.

the type of party system, the personal qualities of the head of state, etc³⁷. On the one hand, this “broadens” the range of political opposition in the case of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies, but, on the other hand, it does not strengthen parliamentary opposition in such political systems. Accordingly, this means that the parliamentary opposition in non-parliamentary democracies is significantly more limited than in the case of parliamentary democracies, and in general the political opposition is much “wide”.

REFERENCES

1. Albrecht H., How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt, “*Democratization*” 2005, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 378–397.
2. Albrecht H., *Political Opposition and Authoritarian Rule in Egypt*, Wyd. Eberhard-Karls Universität Tübingen 2008.
3. Alibasic A., *Political Opposition in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought in The Arab World*, Kuala Lumpur 1999.
4. Anderson L., Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition: Reflections on the Middle East, “*Journal of International Affairs*” 1987, vol 40, nr. 2, s. 219–232.
5. Barker R., *Studies in Opposition*, Wyd. Macmillan 1971.
6. Blondel J., Political Opposition in the Contemporary World, “*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr. 4, s. 462–486.
7. Boucek F., Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism, “*Party Politics*” 2009, vol 15, nr. 4, s. 455–485.
8. Brack N., Weinblum S., “Political Opposition”: Towards a Renewed Research Agenda, “*Interdisciplinary Political Studies*” 2011, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 69–79.
9. Brack N., Weinblum S., *What do we mean by “political opposition”: A theoretical perspective*, Presented at Potsdam ECPR General Conference (9–12 September 2009).
10. Dahl R., Governments and Political Oppositions, [w:] Greenstein F., Polsby N. (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3: Macropolitical Theory*, Wyd. Addison Wesley 1975.
11. Dahl R., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1966.
12. Dahl R., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1971.
13. Dahl R., Thinking About Democratic Constitutions: Conclusions From Democratic Experience, [w:] Dahl R. (eds.), *Toward Democracy: A Journey. Reflections, 1940–1997*, Wyd. University of California 1997, s. 496–499.
14. De Jouvenel B., The Means of Contestation, “*Government and Opposition*” 1965–1966, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 155–174.
15. Dubrow J., Tomescu I., *Political Opposition to the USA Patriot Act of 2001*, Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (14 August 2004).

³⁷ Morgenstern S., Negri J., Perez-Linan A., Parliamentary Opposition in Non-Parliamentary Regimes: Latin America, “*The Journal of Legislative Studies*” 2008, vol 14, nr. 1-2, s. 160–189.

16. Foltz W., Political Oppositions in Single-Party States of Tropical Africa, [w:] Dahl R. (ed.), *Regimes and Oppositions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1973, s. 143–170.
17. Giulj S., Confrontation or Conciliation: the Status of the Opposition in Europe, “*Government and Opposition*” 1981, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 476–494.
18. Giulj S., *Le statut de l’opposition en Europe*, Wyd. Documentation Française 1980.
19. Hallin D., Mancini P., *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.
20. Helms L., Introduction: Studying Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies: Issues and Perspectives, “*The Journal of Legislative Studies*” 2008, vol 14, nr. 1, s. 6–19.
21. Ionescu G., de Madariaga I., *Die Opposition. Ihre politische Funktion in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Wyd. Beck 1971.
22. Ionescu G., de Madariaga I., *Opposition: Past and Present of a Political Institution*, Wyd. The New Thinker Library 1968.
23. Kerr H., The Structure of the Opposition in the Swiss Parliament, “*Legislative Studies Quarterly*” 1978, vol 3, s. 51–62.
24. King A., Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany, “*Legislative Studies Quarterly*” 1976, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 11–34.
25. Kolinsky E. Opposition, [w:] Bogdanor V. (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science*, Wyd. Blackwell 1992, s. 397–400.
26. Kolinsky E., *Opposition in Western Europe*, Wyd. Croom Helm 1987.
27. Kramm L., Grundzüge einer Theorie der politische opposition, “*Zeitschrift für Politik*” 1986, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 33–43.
28. Krauss E., The Mass Media and Japanese Politics: Effects and Consequences, [w:] Pharr S., Krauss E. (eds.), *Media and Politics in Japan*, Wyd. University of Hawaii Press 1996.
29. Linz J., Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference, [w:] Linz J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3–87.
30. Luhmann N., Theorie der politischen Opposition, “*Zeitschrift für Politik*” 1989, vol 36, nr. 1, s. 13–26.
31. Lust-Okar E., The Management of Opposition: Formal Structures of Contestation and Informal Political Manipulation, [w:] Schlumberger O. (ed.), *Debating Arab Authoritarianism. Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 2007.
32. Mayhew D., *America’s Congress. Actions in the Public Sphere, James Madison Through Newt Gingrich*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000.
33. McLennan B., Approaches to the Concept of Political Opposition: An Historical Overview, [w:] McLennan B. (ed.), *Political Opposition and Dissent*, Wyd. Dunellen 1973, s. 1–50.
34. Morgenstern S., Negri J., Perez-Linan A., Parliamentary Opposition in Non-Parliamentary Regimes: Latin America, “*The Journal of Legislative Studies*” 2008, vol 14, nr. 1-2, s. 160–189.
35. Niclauß K., *Das Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Wyd. Schöningh 1995.

36. Norton P., Making Sense of Opposition, *"The Journal of Legislative Studies"* 2008, vol 14, nr. 1, s. 236–250.
37. Parry G., Opposition Questions, *"Government and Opposition"* 1997, vol 32, nr. 4, s. 457–461.
38. Rodan G., Theorising Political Opposition in East and Southeast Asia, [w:] Rodan G. (ed.), *Political Opposition in Industrializing Asia*, Wyd. Routledge 1996, s. 1–39.
39. Sadoun M., Opposition et démocratie, *"Pouvoirs. Revue Française d'Etudes Constitutionnelles et Politiques"* 2004, vol 108, s. 5–21.
40. Sartori G., Opposition and Control: Problems and Prospects, *"Government and Opposition"* 1966, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 149–154.
41. Schapiro L., Foreword, *"Government and Opposition"* 1966, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 2.
42. Sciarini P., The Decision-Making Process, [w:] Klothe U. (ed.), *Handbook of Swiss Politics*, Wyd. Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2007, s. 465–499.
43. Stepan A., Skach C., Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism, *"World Politics"* 1993, vol 46, nr. 1, s. 1–22.
44. Tibi B., Politische Opposition in Westasien und in Afrika. Einige vergleichende und typisierende Betrachtungen, [w:] Euchner W. (ed.), *Politische Opposition in Deutschland und im internationalen Vergleich*, Wyd. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1993, s. 155–172.
45. Tsebelis G., *Veto players: How political institutions work*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2002.
46. Wjatrz J., Przeworski A., Control without Opposition, *"Government and Opposition"* 1966., vol 1, nr. 2, s. 227–239.